Economic performance (economic profits, economic income, or underlying operating performance) of a firm is not observable. Market participants use accounting earnings and other proxies to measure the otherwise unobservable economic performance. Ball and Brown (1968) show that accounting earnings capture the economic performance to some extent. In particular, they find that accounting earnings are correlated with stock returns (value relevant). We hypothesize and show that changes in financial leverage are also value relevant. We document a significantly negative association between changes in financial leverage and contemporaneous risk-adjusted stock returns. The information in changes in financial leverage is incremental to the information in earnings-based measures. Furthermore, we find that changes in financial leverage are also negatively associated with future risk-adjusted returns. This evidence suggests that the information in changes in financial leverage is not impounded in stock prices in a timely fashion.
Introduction
Economic performance (economic profits, economic income, or underlying operating performance) of a firm is not directly observable. Accounting earnings and earningsbased financial ratios such as return on equity are the most commonly used proxies to measure economic performance. Ball and Brown (1968) show that earnings and earnings-based measures are associated with stock returns and, therefore, such measures are considered value relevant.
1 Although accounting earnings is an important variable for determining market value, accounting was not developed for the sole purpose of computing value. Hence, it is natural that accounting earnings would not completely represent the market's overall assessment of a firm's economic performance. We hypothesize that changes in financial leverage contain information about economic performance and are value relevant. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that annual stock returns are significantly associated with contemporaneous changes in financial leverage and, hence, changes in financial leverage are value relevant. Furthermore, the information in changes in financial leverage is incremental to the information in earningsbased measures.
Our arguments are based on the theoretical models of Myers (1984) , Myers and Majluf (1984) and Miller and Rock (1984) . Consider a firm with an optimal financial leverage at time t. In other words, financial leverage, on average, is not expected to change from time t to t+1 (e.g., from the beginning of the year to the end of the year).
Now consider a year during which (between t and t+1) managers realize that the firm would need more cash than what they had anticipated or had planned; the managers realize that the underlying operations of the firm are not performing as well as they were expected to perform. 2 A simple solution to remedy the situation would be to increase the firm's borrowings. Alternatively, the firm can go to the equity market or raise funds from a combination of equity and debt. However, as a first step, most firms are likely to avoid the equity market to the extent possible because going to the equity market is more costly relative to going to the debt market (Myers (1984) ). For instance, borrowings can often be accomplished easily by using the existing line of credit. Hence, deterioration in economic performance will manifest itself in an increase in the level of debt or financial leverage (debt divided by total assets). In our discussion for one firm, we use change in the level of debt and change in financial leverage synonymously. In our empirical work, we use financial leverage instead of the level of debt for two reasons: financial leverage is comparable across firms whereas level of debt by itself is difficult to compare, and change in financial leverage controls for normal growth. We specifically discuss how we control for the effect of growth on debt in the next section since additional debt may also be needed for growth.
Although it is a simple argument, we believe that it is an important one with theoretical underpinnings. For historical reasons, accountants and financial analysts turn to the income statement to infer the economic performance of the firm. Given the arguments above, changes in financial leverage may provide additional information about economic performance. However, this hypothesis has not been examined before, at least not extensively. Recent value-relevance literature surveys (Holthausen and Watts (2001) , Kothari (2001) , and Beaver (2002)) do not mention the change in financial leverage as a candidate for value relevance. Financial statement analysis textbooks also do not discuss the possibility that changes in financial leverage can be used to evaluate economic performance. Hence, we believe that this topic deserves special attention.
The intuition behind the theoretical models of Myers (1984) and others is that earnings-based measures may fall short in measuring economic performance because earnings are noisy, and that changes in financial leverage help us learn about the noise.
For example, the choice to capitalize or to expense a particular economic loss is governed by GAAP rather than by a sound theory that maps economic earnings to accounting data.
Because an unknown part of economic earnings is capitalized, market participants cannot perfectly infer economic performance from observing changes in GAAP earnings alone.
Hence, other variables such as change in financial leverage can be helpful. The recent incident of earnings management (a form of noise) by WorldCom can be used as an illustration of our idea. We are not suggesting that our hypothesis has anything to do with detecting fraud or that this illustration is comprehensive. Instead, we discuss it because it captures the spirit of our inquiry.
For the year ended December 31, 2001, WorldCom reported a net income of $1.5 billion and cash flows from operations (CFFO) of $8.0 billion. It appears reasonable to argue that because GAAP earnings are noisy, the economic performance was $1.5+ε (or, $8.0+ε in cash flow terms), where noise ε is not observable unconditionally. Our argument is that conditional on change in the level of debt (or financial leverage), the market can learn something about ε. WorldCom's debt in 2001 went up from $24.9 to $30.1 billion, an increase of $5.2 billion. Financial leverage or debt to total assets changed from 25.1% to 28.9% (total assets changed from $98.9 to $103.9 billion). To mask the poor performance, the company capitalized costs instead of expensing them.
The end result was that both reported earnings and CFFO were overstated by a substantial amount (billions of dollars) and were incorrect or noisy measures of economic performance. 3 Similarly, cash flows from investing were also incorrect because of excessive amounts were capitalized. However, the change in debt of $5. 4 One way to think about the inferring process is that the market assigns probabilities to the usage of additional debt. In the WorldCom illustration, for example, the market observes an increase in debt of $5.2 billion (or an increase in financial leverage from 25.1% to 28.9%). There is always some probability that the firm would have used some of these funds for masking the deteriorating performance. After all, every reported accounting number has some subjective component (e.g., capitalizing versus expensing). Essentially, we have argued that, on average, if debt goes up disproportionately (i.e., change in leverage is positive), the market assigns a non-zero probability to the to the extent that the market was able to infer that the entire $5.2 billion or some of the $5.2 billion in new debt was used for operations, the market would impound this information in stock prices. In other words, to the extent that the change in financial leverage plays a role in market's assessment of economic performance, we can test it empirically.
In terms of association between fundamental information and stock prices, our arguments are similar to those prevalent in the literature since at least Ball and Brown (1968) . In Ball and Brown (1968) , the variable of interest was earnings; in our study, the variable of interest is change in leverage. By observing changes in financial leverage, the market gleans knowledge about economic performance, potentially beyond what can be learned by earnings alone. If financial leverage is observed to have increased (declined), the economic performance, on average, can be inferred to have deteriorated (improved).
So long as the market impounds this information in stock prices, we hypothesize that changes in financial leverage are negatively associated with risk-adjusted stock returns;
i.e., changes in financial leverage are value relevant.
Our primary objective is to test the above hypothesis. Consistent with our prediction, we document a significantly negative association between changes in financial leverage and contemporaneous stock returns. The Pearson correlation coefficient between change in financial leverage and contemporaneous returns is -0.1659.
The change in financial leverage is highly significant even when we use both change in financial leverage and change in earnings in a regression framework. Our results are also robust to controlling for risk measures given by book-to-market, size and beta. We use possibility that some of the new debt was used to mask deteriorating operating performance.
both the Fama-MacBeth (1973) methodology and the four-factor model as first developed by Fama and French (1993) and subsequently modified by Carhart (1997) . Overall, change in financial leverage is an important variable from the perspective of value relevance.
Our secondary objective is to extend our analysis to future returns. In value relevance studies, researchers examine future returns to investigate whether the market impounds the information in a timely fashion. The value relevance evidence (association with contemporaneous returns) by itself does not imply that all the information has been impounded in stock prices. Ever since Ball and Brown (1968) , researchers have found that market prices continue to drift in the same direction as that of the initial reaction to information Thomas (1989, 1990) ). In the present context, there is at least one strong a priori reason why we expect a drift following the year in which financial leverage changes. As we mentioned earlier, the change in financial leverage has traditionally not been considered to be an indicator of economic performance. Therefore, we conjecture that this knowledge is not impounded in stock prices in a timely fashion.
The results support our conjecture. We find prices continue to drift in the same direction in the following year. A hedge portfolio based on change in financial leverage quintiles yields 8.23% in the year following the formation of the portfolios. The results are larger if we use both earnings-based measures and change in financial leverage (hedge return of about 11%), and, hence, results are not explained away by earnings-related drift. Our results are robust to using the Fama-MacBeth framework or using the four factor FamaFrench-Carhart approach. We conclude that the market is not able to fully process the information contained in changes in financial leverage until the following year.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss in detail how we control for changes in leverage attributable to growth, and relate our work to previous studies. In Section 3 we describe the sample selection procedure and present descriptive statistics for the data. In Section 4 we present the results for the contemporaneous associations among stock returns, changes in financial leverage, and changes in traditional measures of operating performance. We extend the study to future returns in Section 5. We present our conclusions in Section 6
Methodological issues and prior research

Controlling for growth
Our focus in this paper is on changes in debt engendered by economic performance. We control for changes in debt that may result from other corporate activities such as normal growth and mergers and acquisitions. To control for the effects of normal growth, we use changes in financial leverage. In particular, for a firm that is growing in a scaleexpanding manner (normal growth), the level of debt, on average, will also increase at the same rate as other items on the balance sheet. Hence, financial leverage is a stationary variable under normal growth scenarios. 5 Also, in an empirical setting, we cannot use the level of debt across firms to decide which firms have large debt; it is necessary to use financial leverage.
We further control for the potential effects of growth beyond normal growth. In one approach, for example, we use cross-sectional regressions of change in financial leverage on growth in total assets and use the residuals from the regressions which are 5 Fairfield, Whisenant and Yohn (2003a, 2003b) show that growth in assets can affect inferences when researchers examine persistence of accruals or cash flows. From a methodological point of view, their discussion clearly shows that controlling for growth is important.
not related to growth. In another approach, we exclude 10% of the firms with extreme growth in total assets. 6 To avoid the effects on financial leverage from merger-related growth, we do not include firm-years in which the firm is known to have had a merger or acquisition so long as it is reported on the Compustat dataset. We also exclude firms with less than two percent debt to total assets since firms with very low financial leverage are known to exhibit high growth rates (Graham (2000) ).
Prior Research
The two objectives of our paper (contemporaneous returns and future returns) have different sets of related studies. With respect to the first objective (association between contemporaneous returns and change in financial leverage), our paper is related to several papers that examine one-year returns. The paper that is perhaps closest to our work is that of Livnat and Zarowin (1990) as they also develop their arguments based on the theoretical financial leverage literature. However, their methodology and conclusions are very different. In a cross-sectional setting, they regress one-year abnormal returns on unexpected changes in cash flows related to debt issuances. Note that they use changes in cash flows (i.e., cash received in net debt issuances in one year minus cash received in net debt issuances in the previous year). Given our arguments, it is not necessary to use a first difference in cash flows because cash flow by itself is first difference in debt levels.
Furthermore, they use data from cash flow statements while we are interested in changes in financial leverage. The cash flow statement does not report all changes in debt. They find that changes in cash flows are positively associated with returns.
While we are not motivated by maximizing R 2 of regressions of stock returns on accounting variables, there are some similarities between papers that examine R 2 and our work. In a survey paper, Lev (1989) documents that over return intervals of up to a year, earnings account for only a small percentage of the variation in stock returns. Easton, Harris and Ohlson (1992) and Lev and Zarowin (1999) (Collins, Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1994) ). As we mention above, our primary motivation is not to add variables to increase R 2 . Our comparison does, however, show that keeping earnings-based variables the same, change in financial leverage increases the R 2 in explaining returns. We expect that if we were to add other variables, we will find that change in financial leverage is incrementally value relevant. Given our focus on change in financial leverage, we do not run a horse race between change in financial leverage and other possible value relevant variables. 8 The second part of our research (and that of Bradshaw et al. (2004) ) is related to debt issue announcement studies (e.g., Eckbo (1986) for short window results and Spiess and There are some other differences between our work and that of Bradshaw et al. (2004) . First, we focus on change in financial leverage, while Bradshaw et al. focus on financing from the cash flow statement divided by beginning assets. Note that the choice of our variable controls for normal growth. In addition, we control for growth beyond normal growth that may affect financial leverage. Overall, our focus is on change in financial leverage that is a manifestation of the economic performance and not of growth, mergers and acquisitions or sudden changes in capital structure for some other reasons.
In this respect, our results further extend their work as they do not distinguish between financing for operating performances and financing for other reasons such as growth.
Finally, cash flow statement generally does not capture all changes in debt.
9 Thus, given our arguments, it is better to use data from the balance sheet.
Data sources and variable definitions
Data sources
The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly stock files provide monthly returns, shares outstanding, and monthly prices for NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks.
Affleck-Graves (1999) for long window results). However, our study is about changes in financial leverage and not about debt issue announcements. A vast majority of debt issues are not announced. Our work is also related to that of Dichev and Piotroski (1999) who examine increases in debt but do not examine decreases in debt and do not control for growth. Our future returns analysis also complements Dichev and Piotroski's (2001) study of long-run returns following bond rating changes. These studies do not focus on contemporaneous returns which is the focus of our study. (2000), we exclude firms with less than $10 million in total assets to avoid extreme financial ratios. As is customary in the literature, because of regulatory factors affecting capital structure choices, we exclude financials (SIC Codes 6000-6999) and regulated utilities (SIC Codes 4900-4949). We begin our study in fiscal year 1973 because this is the first year in which data on a reasonable number of firms are available on both Compustat and CRSP.
Variable definitions
Financial leverage and change in financial leverage
We define total debt as the sum of long-term debt (Compustat item #9) and short-term debt (Compustat item #34). Financial leverage (Leverage) is defined as total debt divided by total assets. Change in financial leverage for fiscal year t (∆Leverage) is measured as the difference between the ending and the beginning financial leverage for that year. The average level of financial leverage (AvLev) during the year is given by the average of leverage at the beginning and the end of the year. For robustness, we also use change in total debt divided by beginning total assets as an alternative measure to proxy for change in financial leverage. We also use a measure based on data on debt issuances (Compustat item#111) and debt retirements or repurchases (Compustat item#114) from the statement of cash flows to compute change in net debt issues. Since we reach similar conclusions from using alternative measures, we report only one set of results using the ∆Leverage variable defined above.
Stock returns
Stock returns are measured using the CRSP monthly tapes. For changes in financial leverage over fiscal year t, current (contemporaneous) stock returns are calculated from
July of year t to June of year t+1. 10 Future stock returns are calculated from July of year t+1 to June of year t+2. Yearly stock returns represent buy-and-hold returns over the specified period. We use delisting returns, when available on the CRSP files, in computing stock returns of firms that are delisted subsequent to the start of the cumulation period. If no delisting returns are available and the firm is delisted during the cumulation period, its yearly returns from that point in time until the end of the cumulation period are set equal to the equally weighted CRSP index.
Market value and book-to-market ratio
Market value of equity (MV) is obtained from the CRSP monthly files, and is defined as the number of shares outstanding times price per share. In all monthly and yearly tests using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) A firm's book-to-market ratio (B/M) is measured using Compustat data, and is defined as the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year. 11 Book value of equity is defined as total assets (Compustat item #6) minus 10 We are implicitly assuming a six-month lag in reporting of accounting data.
total liabilities (Compustat item #181) plus balance sheet deferred tax & investment tax credit (if available) (Compustat item #35). We exclude firms with book-to-market ratios of less than 0.01 and greater than 100.
Return on equity and return on assets
Throughout this paper, we use income before extraordinary items (Compustat data #123)
as our measure of accounting earnings. Since the level of earnings is not easily comparable across firms and time, we divide it by the beginning-of-the-year book value of equity as the denominator in computing return on equity (ROE). 12 From the shareholders' perspective, a firm's operations are assumed to have performed well (poorly) if ∆ROE= ROE t -ROE t-1 is positive (negative). We exclude firms with less than $5 million in book value of equity to avoid extreme values of ROE and ∆ROE. We also use return on assets (ROA) as another traditional measure of operating performance.
The return on assets is defined as operating earnings (Compustat item #13) divided by total assets. 13 Since the results are similar whether we use ROE or ROA, we present only the ROE-based results.
Sample construction
We earlier discussed how we control for possible effects of growth on financial leverage.
Because we start with a very large dataset (entire Compustat), we make additional cuts to 11 For computing book-to-market ratio, we use Compustat for both the book value of equity and the market value of equity. Market value of equity for computing B/M is given by number of shares outstanding (Compustat item #25) multiplied by the fiscalyear-end closing price per share (Compustat item #199).
12 Our conclusions are not affected if we divide earnings by the average of beginning and ending book value of equity. 13 The Pearson correlation coefficient between ROE and ROA in our sample is 0.62.
increase the power of our tests. In particular, we do not use returns for three years following an initial public offering or a seasoned equity offering. Researchers have documented a significant long-run underperformance by such stocks (see, e.g., Ritter
(1991)). Therefore, returns are likely to be driven by overvaluation rather than changes in operations. Finally, we exclude firms with |∆Leverage| ≥ 25%, because such extreme changes in financial leverage are likely to represent data errors, reclassification of assets and liabilities, or other transactions unrelated to economic performance. We note that the equally-weighted average annual return of 18.03% for the entire period for our sample is slightly larger than the 17.20% (13.13%) return on the CRSP equally (value) weighted index during the same period (details not reported). For all the years together, the average financial leverage is 0.2595 and the average ROE is 7.08%. Our results are similar whether we use AvLev as a control variable or do not.
Summary statistics
Change in financial leverage and contemporaneous stock returns
In this section, we document a strong negative contemporaneous association between changes in financial leverage and (risk-adjusted) stock returns. We use both a portfolio approach and a structural regression approach to document our results. In the portfolio approach, consistent with common practice in analyzing portfolio returns, we examine average raw returns across several portfolios. The main advantage of this approach is that raw returns are easy to interpret. Results based on risk-adjusted returns (presented later) do not affect our conclusions based on the portfolio approach. Table 3 , Panel A presents current (contemporaneous except for the assumed delay in reporting of accounting data) annual returns for five portfolios of stocks sorted on change in financial leverage (∆Leverage). We also report averages of additional characteristics (∆ROE, book-to-market ratio, and market value of equity) of the firms in the portfolios.
Portfolio approach
The average ∆Leverage for firms in portfolio one is -0.0874, which is about 34% of the average sample leverage of 0.2595 reported in Table 1 . For portfolio five, the average ∆Leverage of 0.0837 is similar in absolute value to that for portfolio one. Thus, the ∆Leverage variable does not appear to be skewed in any direction. In the next column (column 3), we report the most important result from this analysis. The average annual stock return on portfolio one is 31.89%, while the average annual stock return on portfolio five is only 5.06%. Furthermore, the average annual portfolio return declines monotonically from portfolio one to portfolio five. The results clearly show that raw stock returns are negatively associated with contemporaneous changes in financial leverage and, in that sense, the change in financial leverage is value relevant.
We examine whether ∆Leverage contains the same information as that contained in the traditional measures based on earnings (ROE) or ∆Leverage provides incremental information. To start with, in Panel B, we present average yearly raw returns on five portfolios sorted on the ∆ROE variable. Similar to the findings in several studies since Ball and Brown (1968) , we also find that ∆ROE is positively associated with contemporaneous returns.
In Table 3 , Panel C, we report average returns on portfolios based on independent sorting of all firms by ∆Leverage and ∆ROE in a five by five matrix. The results show that, after controlling for the effect of ∆ROE, the ∆Leverage variable remains significant in explaining the variation in contemporaneous stock returns. Consider, for example, the first column (the smallest ∆ROE quintile). Within this column, the difference in average returns between the two extreme ∆Leverage portfolios is 14.57%, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. Similarly, within each of the other four columns, ∆Leverage remains significant in explaining the variation in contemporaneous stock returns. We conclude that both ∆ROE and ∆Leverage are separately important in explaining contemporaneous stock returns.
Current (contemporaneous) risk-adjusted returns
In this section, we use the four-factor Fama-French-Carhart time series model and the Fama-MacBeth regression approach to control for the effects of several potential characteristics on stock returns. In Table 4 , we report results based on the four-factor Fama-French-Carhart model. Then, in Table 5 , we report results based on the FamaMacBeth methodology.
Four-factor Fama-French-Carhart time series regressions:
The Fama-French-Carhart method controls for known stock market return patters associated with market, book-to-market, size, and momentum in a unified time series R mt is the monthly value-weighted market return from CRSP, R ft is the monthly risk-free rate, SMB is the size-factor mimicking portfolio for the returns on small minus big stocks, HML is the book-to-market (B/M) factor mimicking portfolio for the returns on high minus low B/M stocks, and UMD is the momentum-factor mimicking portfolio for the returns on high minus low momentum stocks. Table 3 , Panel A.
In Table 4 , Panel B, we report alphas and the associated t-statistics for 25 portfolios of stocks based on an independent, two-way sort on ∆ROE and ∆Leverage.
For brevity, we do not report the results for the coefficients on the four factors. Similar to the conclusion reached with raw returns, the results show that the ∆Leverage variable is important in explaining the variation in contemporaneous risk-adjusted stock returns, even after controlling for the effects of ∆ROE. In all cases, the differences (Low-High)
between alphas of extreme portfolios are in the expected direction and statistically significant.
Fama-MacBeth regressions
One important advantage of the Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach is that it allows for the inclusion of several variables in the monthly or annual cross-sectional regressions. This methodology allows us to use ∆Leverage and ∆ROE simultaneously as explanatory variables to explore whether the effect of ∆ROE captures the effect of ∆Leverage.
Following Fama and French (1992) and Bhandari (1988) , we use book-to-market, size, and the level of leverage as three control variables that are generally considered to be risk measures, and are often used in the Fama-MacBeth approach. In addition, motivated by Hamada (1972) , we use change in equity beta (∆Beta) as another variable that can potentially explain current returns. In particular, if increase (decrease) in financial leverage increases (decreases) equity beta and no other changes affect equity beta (such as asset beta, new projects, change in leverage due to operating performance, etc.), changes in equity beta could affect stock returns. However, prior research (Fama and French (1992) , Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) ) has shown that levels of beta and changes in beta has had almost zero association with stock returns in this time period.
Thus, we do not expect change in beta to be significantly associated with current returns but we include it as a control variable.
14 Table 5 14 Betas are computed using the market model (Brown and Warner (1980) ) based on 24 monthly returns. The Pearson correlation between ∆Beta and ∆Leverage in our sample is only 0.0462.
returns. While change in earnings (or ROE) is well accepted in the literature as value relevant, we conclude that the change in financial leverage is also value relevant.
As yet another robustness check, we analyze our results by using a regression approach to control for the effects of growth on changes in financial leverage. To accomplish this, we run cross-sectional regressions of change in financial leverage on growth in total assets. We then use the residuals from these regressions to proxy for the change in financial leverage that is not related to growth. The results (not reported but available from authors on request) from this analysis are similar to those presented in the paper.
Change is financial leverage and future stock returns
In the previous section we documented that change in financial leverage (∆Leverage) is associated with contemporaneous risk-adjusted stock returns. In this section, we explore whether ∆Leverage is also associated with future (one-year ahead) raw and risk-adjusted stock returns. The research methodology in this section parallels the research methodology in the previous section, except that we now use future returns instead of current (contemporaneous) returns. Thus, we do not describe the research methodology anew, and discuss our results directly. Table 6 , Panel A shows the results for five portfolios based on current ∆Leverage. 15 The difference in the annual future raw returns between portfolio one (low ∆Leverage) and 15 Note that the numbers of observations in Table 6 are slightly larger than the corresponding numbers in Table 3 , where we reported results for contemporaneous returns. We use the maximum number of observations available in any situation for which returns are computed. The results are similar when we force the number of observations to be equal by requiring the availability of data in both periods.
Portfolio approach
portfolio five (high ∆Leverage) is 8.23% (see column 3), which is statistically significant at the 1% level. These results show that ∆Leverage is negatively associated with future returns. Table 6 , Panel B shows the results for the portfolios based on the change in return on equity (∆ROE) over the previous year. The future return spread between portfolio one (largest drop in ROE) and portfolio five (largest improvement in ROE) is -3.78%, which, in absolute terms, is less than half the spread based on the ∆Leverage variable reported in Panel A. Table 6 , Panel C shows average future returns for 25 portfolios of stocks sorted independently by ∆Leverage and ∆ROE. We find that the differences in returns between ∆Leverage-based portfolios one and five are statistically significant for all five levels of ∆ROE (between 3.67% and 10.73%, see the last row).
Since patterns in future returns should be examined more carefully (because of market inefficiency implications) than patterns in current returns, we also examine future returns using various two-way and three-way sorts based on ∆Leverage, book-to-market, size and average level of leverage (results not reported but available from authors).
Generally, we find that the ∆Leverage effect is largely independent of the other effects.
For example, when we use both book-to-market and ∆Leverage in a two-way sort, the difference in average returns across extreme portfolios (high book-to-market and low ∆Leverage vs. low book-to-market and high ∆Leverage) is substantially larger than the corresponding difference in average returns when either variable is used alone to form portfolios. regressions. The alphas are monthly risk-adjusted returns after controlling for the market effect, the book-to-market effect, the size effect, and the momentum effect. We find that firms in portfolio one (low ∆Leverage) exhibit a positive and significant alpha of 0.4481%, or about 5.38% per year. Correspondingly, firms in portfolio five (high ∆Leverage) exhibit a negative and significant alpha of -0.2493%, or about -2.99% per year. Thus, the spread between portfolios one and five, after controlling for the effects of the four factors, is 8.37% per year. This result is similar to the raw return spread of 8.23% reported in Table 6 , Panel A.
Future Risk-adjusted Returns
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In Table 7 , Panel B, we report alphas and the associated t-statistics for portfolios from a two-way five by five sort. The main result from this analysis is that, when we control for ∆ROE, the differences in alphas for low and high ∆Leverage portfolios (see the bottom row) are all positive and are significant in four out of the five cases. Thus, ∆Leverage is consistently associated with future risk-adjusted returns, even after controlling for the effects of ∆ROE.
As a final analysis, we use the Fama-MacBeth approach to run cross-sectional regressions of future stock returns on several firm characteristics including ∆Leverage and ∆ROE. Note that a change in beta emanating from change in financial leverage cannot explain future returns since increase in beta (potentially from increase in financial leverage) would imply larger returns. Instead, we have smaller alphas or returns for the firms that increase financial leverage. Table 8 , Panel A shows the results from using monthly returns, while Panel B shows the results from using yearly returns. In Table 8 , Panel A, we find that, when ∆Leverage is included along with the three control variables (Model 2), the t-statistic for the coefficient on ∆Leverage is -5.98. However, when ∆ROE is included along with the three control variables (Model 3), the coefficient on ∆ROE is positive but statistically insignificant (t-statistic of 1.50). Furthermore, when both ∆Leverage and ∆ROE are included together (Model 4), the coefficient on ∆ROE becomes smaller and the t-statistic goes down to 0.38. The magnitude and significance of the coefficient on ∆Leverage is about the same whether ∆ROE is included in the regression or not. 17 In Table 8 , Panel B, we find that similar to the results in Panel A, the coefficients and the t-statistics on ∆Leverage are about the same whether or not we include ∆ROE as an explanatory variable. Thus, ∆Leverage clearly plays an important role in explaining future returns, and its role is not subsumed by ∆ROE. We conclude that information in change in financial leverage does not seem to be impounded in stock prices in a timely fashion.
Conclusions
Ball and Brown (1968) , Beaver (1968) and several follow up studies show that earnings and earnings-based financial ratios such as return on equity and return on assets 17 The magnitude of the coefficient on ∆Leverage in Model 4 is -3.09 which may be interpreted as a risk-adjusted return of -3.09% for 1.0 movement in ∆Leverage. In Table  6 , when we go from portfolio one to portfolio five, ∆Leverage changes by -0.1919. Thus, the coefficient of -3.09 translates into a risk-adjusted spread of -3.09x-0.1919, or 0.5930% per month, or about 7.11% per year. This spread is similar in magnitude to 8.23% based on the portfolio approach reported in Table 6 . Thus, the Fama-MacBeth results for ∆Leverage are similar to the results based on raw returns.
are associated with contemporaneous risk-adjusted stock returns. Thus, earnings seem to capture economic performance (economic profits or economic income). Clearly, earnings alone cannot possibly capture the economic performance completely. Based on theoretical models of Myers (1984) and others, we hypothesize that financial leverage is affected by economic performance. In particular, deterioration (improvement) in economic performance is expected to lead to an increase (decrease) in financial leverage.
Hence, so far as that the market impounds this information in stock prices, we should In value relevance or association studies, it is important to extend the analysis to future returns to examine whether information is impounded in stock prices completely in a timely fashion. The association part of our study, by itself, cannot establish that all the information in changes in financial leverage is impounded in stock prices in a timely fashion. In particular, we have one strong a priori reason to expect stock prices to drift in the same direction beyond the year in which we observe change in financial leverage. This is because change in financial leverage is generally not viewed as a proxy to measure economic performance; there is no discussion of such a possibility in most accounting textbooks, to our knowledge. Hence, we conjecture that the market is not fully knowledgeable about the value relevant nature of changes in financial leverage.
Consistent with this conjecture, we find that stock prices continue to drift in the same direction at least for one more year following the year in which we measure change in financial leverage. These results also hold after controlling for the effects of earningsbased variables.
We do not suggest that the change in financial leverage is a substitute for earnings or a better variable than earnings for measuring economic performance. In our view, various measures of operating performance should be complementary. Our proposition is simply that earnings-based measures do not summarize all the relevant information related to economic performance. Hence, the change in financial leverage variable should be an additional useful proxy to better understand the economic performance of a firm. We hope that in certain circumstances, researchers and practitioners will find it useful to infer economic performance by observing changes in financial leverage.
It is important to recognize that even if one or more variables are likely to capture economic performance, we should not immediately run a horse race between them to find out whether there is a winning variable. After all, if these variables are not perfectly correlated, they could work better relative to one another in different settings even if, on average, they have similar explanatory power. Furthermore, for the purpose of focusing on one value-relevant variable (limiting the scope of this paper), we have not incorporated other possible value-relevant variables in this study. We plan to conduct additional research to analyze several variables at the same time and to compare and contrast the contributions from different variables toward understanding economic performance. One problem with the choice of additional variables is the lack of theoretical developments. In our analysis, the choice of change in financial leverage is guided by the theory of Myers (1984) and others. Both theoretical and empirical research in future will present us with opportunities to extend our state of knowledge considerably.
TABLE 1 Summary Statistics of Sample Firms by Year
This table presents descriptive statistics for a sample of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms with available information on CRSP and Compustat, excluding financials and utilities. Leverage for year t is defined as total debt divided by total assets at the end of fiscal year t. We exclude firms with total assets of less than $10 million, book equity of less than $5 million, leverage at the end of fiscal year t-1 of less than 2 percent, and book-to-market ratio at the end of year t-1 or t of less than 0.01 and greater than 100. Firms are also excluded from the sample in year t if they reported a merger or acquisition on Compustat in either year t-1 or t, or if they had an IPO or SEO in the three years prior to July of year t. Current returns are for the period from July of year t to June of year t+1. MV is the market value of equity at the end of June of year t, and is reported in millions of dollars. B/M is the book-to-market ratio at the end of fiscal year t-1. AvLev equals Leverage at the end of fiscal year t plus Leverage at the end of fiscal year t-1, divided by two. ∆Leverage equals Leverage at the end of year t minus Leverage at the end of year t-1. We exclude firms with ∆Leverage of less than -0.25 and greater than 0.25. ROE is income before extraordinary items for fiscal year t divided by book equity at the end of fiscal year t-1. ∆ROE equals ROE for fiscal year t minus ROE for fiscal year t-1. Numbers in the table represent arithmetic means over the particular year. 
TABLE 2 Correlations Between Change in Leverage and Firm Characteristics
This table presents the average yearly Pearson correlation coefficients between current change in leverage, current change in return on equity, leverage, current and future (one-year ahead) stock returns, book-tomarket and market value of equity. Leverage for year t is defined as total debt divided by total assets at the end of fiscal year t. ∆Leverage equals Leverage at the end of year t minus Leverage at the end of year t-1. Current returns are buy and hold returns for the period from July of year t to June of year t+1. Future returns are buy and hold returns for the period from July of year t+1 to June of year t+2. ROE is income before extraordinary items for fiscal year t divided by book equity at the end of fiscal year t-1. ∆ROE equals ROE for fiscal year t minus ROE for fiscal year t-1. AvLev equals Leverage at the end of fiscal year t plus Leverage at the end of fiscal year t-1, divided by two. B/M is the book-to-market ratio at the end of fiscal year t. MV is the market value of equity at the end of June of year t+1. Numbers in parenthesis report the t-statistic for the average of the 29 yearly correlation coefficients. (Panel B) , and 5x5 portfolios of firms sorted independently by change in leverage and change in return on equity (Panel C). Leverage for year t is defined as total debt divided by total assets at the end of fiscal year t. ∆Leverage equals Leverage at the end of year t minus Leverage at the end of year t-1. Current returns are buy and hold returns for the period from July of year t to June of year t+1. ROE is income before extraordinary items for fiscal year t divided by book equity at the end of fiscal year t-1. ∆ROE equals ROE for fiscal year t minus ROE for fiscal year t-1. B/M is the book-to-market ratio at the end of fiscal year t-1. MV is the market value of equity at the end of June of year t, and is reported in millions of dollars. Significance levels are calculated based on t-statistics for the mean of the 29 yearly differences. (Panel B) . Portfolio returns are monthly returns from July of year t to June of year t+1. ∆Leverage is the change in total debt divided by assets over fiscal year t. R mt is the monthly value-weighted market return, R ft is the monthly risk-free rate, SMB is the sizefactor mimicking portfolio for the returns on small minus big stocks, HML is the B/M-factor mimicking portfolio for the returns of high minus low B/M stocks, and UMD is the momentum-factor mimicking portfolio for the returns of high minus low momentum. All factors data are obtained from Kenneth French's website. Numbers in parenthesis report t-statistic for significance of the mean of the monthly coefficients. Panel A reports the result for all four-factors. Panel B reports the intercepts and the corresponding t-statistics for 25 portfolios based of stocks sorted independently into quintiles by change in ROE and change in leverage.
Panel Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions of current monthly and annual stock returns on changes in financial leverage and a number of firm characteristics. Values in parenthesis report the tstatistics for the average monthly/annual coefficients. Returns are for the period from July of year t to June of year t+1, and are converted in percentages. B/M is the book-to-market ratio at the end of fiscal year t-1. MV is the market value of equity at the end of June of year t. Leverage for year t is defined as total debt divided by total assets at the end of fiscal year t. AvLev equals Leverage at the end of fiscal year t plus Leverage at the end of fiscal year t-1, divided by two. ∆Leverage equals Leverage at the end of year t minus Leverage at the end of year t-1. ROE is income before extraordinary items for fiscal year t divided by book equity at the end of fiscal year t-1. ∆ROE equals ROE for fiscal year t minus ROE for fiscal year t-1. Pre-formation equity betas are calculated using monthly stock returns over the 24 months ending in June of year t. Post-formation equity betas are calculated using monthly stock returns over the 24 months starting in July of year t+1. ∆Beta is the defined as the difference between the post-formation and preformation beta. Panel A reports monthly cross-sectional regressions using monthly stock returns as the dependent variable. Panel B reports yearly cross-sectional regressions using buy-and-hold returns as the dependent variable. (Panel B) , and 5x5 portfolios of firms sorted independently by change in leverage and change in return on equity (Panel C). Leverage for year t is defined as total debt divided by total assets at the end of fiscal year t. ∆Leverage equals Leverage at the end of year t minus Leverage at the end of year t-1. Future returns are buy and hold returns for the period from July of year t+1 to June of year t+2. ROE is income before extraordinary items for fiscal year t divided by book equity at the end of fiscal year t-1. ∆ROE equals ROE for fiscal year t minus ROE for fiscal year t-1. B/M is the book-to-market ratio at the end of fiscal year t. MV is the market value of equity at the end of June of year t+1, and is reported in millions of dollars. Significance levels are calculated based on t-statistics for the mean of the 28 yearly differences. (Panel B) . Portfolio returns are monthly returns from July of year t+1 to June of year t+2. ∆Leverage is the change in total debt divided by assets over fiscal year t. R mt is the monthly value-weighted market return, R ft is the monthly risk-free rate, SMB is the size-factor mimicking portfolio for the returns on small minus big stocks, HML is the B/M-factor mimicking portfolio for the returns of high minus low B/M stocks, and UMD is the momentum-factor mimicking portfolio for the returns of high minus low momentum. All factors data are obtained from Kenneth French's website. Numbers in parenthesis report t-statistic for significance of the mean of the monthly coefficients. Panel A reports the result for all four-factors. Panel B reports the intercepts and the corresponding t-statistics for 25 portfolios based of stocks sorted independently into quintiles by change in ROE and change in leverage.
Panel Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions of future monthly and annual stock returns on changes in financial leverage and a number of firm characteristics. Values in parenthesis report the t-statistics for the average monthly/annual coefficients. Returns are for the period from July of year t+1 to June of year t+2, and are converted in percentages. B/M is the book-to-market ratio at the end of fiscal year t. MV is the market value of equity at the end of June of year t+1. Leverage for year t is defined as total debt divided by total assets at the end of fiscal year t. AvLev equals Leverage at the end of fiscal year t plus Leverage at the end of fiscal year t-1, divided by two. ∆Leverage equals Leverage at the end of year t minus Leverage at the end of year t-1. ROE is income before extraordinary items for fiscal year t divided by book equity at the end of fiscal year t-1. ∆ROE equals ROE for fiscal year t minus ROE for fiscal year t-1. Panel A reports monthly cross-sectional regressions using monthly stock returns as the dependent variable. Panel B reports yearly cross-sectional regressions using buy-and-hold returns as the dependent variable. 
